When not at war, armies are often used to control civil disorders,
especially in eras of rapid social change and unrest. But in nineteenth
century Europe, without the technological advances of modern armies and
police forces, an army's only advantages were discipline and
organization--and in the face of popular opposition to the regime in
power, both could rapidly deteriorate. Such was the case in France after
the Napoleonic Wars, where a cumulative recent history of failure
weakened an already fragile army's ability to keep the peace.
After the February 1848 overthrow of the last king of France, the new
republican government proved remarkably resilient, retaining power while
pursuing moderate social policies despite the concerted efforts of a
variety of radical and socialist groups. These efforts took numerous
forms, ranging from demonstrations to attempted coups to full-scale
urban combat, and culminated in the crisis of the June Days. At stake
was the future of French government and the social and economic policy
of France at large.
In Controlling Paris, Jonathan M. House offers us a study of revolution
from the viewpoint of the government rather than the revolutionary. It
is not focused on military tactics so much as on the broader issues
involved in controlling civil disorders: relations between the
government and its military leaders, causes and social issues of public
disorder, political loyalty of troops in crisis, and excessive use of
force to control civil disorders. Yet somehow, despite all these
disadvantages, the French police and armed forces prevented regime
change far more often than they failed to do so.
