Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters
over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of
democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic
procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic
Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on
the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on
democracy's tendency to make good decisions.
Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and
legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular
decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the
procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending
toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions
were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best
shouldn't simply rule.
Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids
epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some
few people probably do know best, this can be used in political
justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable
points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this
respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies
actually authorized by the people subject to them.
